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Abstract
When statistical models are used in social sciences, there is no presumption that actual reality is
stochastic. Even if actual reality is deterministic, hidden and unobservable variables require a use
of effective (in ordinary language, approximate) models, with number of variables potentially un-
restricted. From the quantum reconstruction point of view, quantum mechanics can be interpreted
as a statistical information-processing framework - therefore, the aforementioned view in social
sciences can naturally be transported to quantum physics - this especially so given prevalent uses
of effective theories. This naturally gives us the common framework behind hidden variables inter-
pretations unconstrained by particular laws of deterministic motion. The measurement problem is
cleanly identified as arising from missing hidden variables. However, hidden variables interpreta-
tions do not imply that a final UV-complete theory of physics has to be usable - the theory may be
uncomputable, with inability to generate predictions. In such a case, an infinite sequence of effec-
tive quantum theories would have to be used. Therefore, even if hidden variables interpretations
are correct, supremacy of the orthodox quantum mechanics framework may be upheld, which is
supported by a combination of quantum reconstruction and computational complexity arguments.
This allows us to bypass considerable difficulties of hidden variables interpretations in satisfying
Lorentz invariance. Connections to entropic gravity are then explored.
Keywords: hidden variables interpretations of quantum mechanics, measurement problem, Bohmian me-
chanics, computable theory, effective theory, Lorentz invariance, quantum reconstruction, computational
complexity, entropic gravity
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a curious state of affairs in an understanding of quantum mechanics. In social
sciences, a quantitative statistical model is used to make predictions but no one assumes
that underlying reality has to be stochastic. It is missing variables we cannot fully account
for that generate stochastic dynamics from roughly deterministic reality. As can be noted,
what is meant by ‘missing variables’ would be interpreted more generally than the particular
Bohmian concept of missing variables.
Somewhat surprisingly given above, quantum physicists are heavily averse to hidden
variables interpretations. (And in some ways, rightly so, as we would come to see.) This is
despite the fact that somewhat fundamental quantum theories in use are effective (in ordi-
nary language, approximate) theories that can essentially be recast as theories with missing
variables or missing information that a final theory of physics would provide. Therefore,
this amounts to the belief that a final theory of physics has to be a quantum theory in sense
that it is not a deterministic theory but a probabilistic theory.
A problem begins to occur though: for a final UV-complete quantum theory, how would
the measurement problem be resolved? In particular, how would a measurement basis
be determined? [1] A hidden variables interpretation provides an easy way out for the
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measurement problem, whether the issue is state (wavefunction) collapse or measurement
basis - it is neglected hidden variables that generate the issue. This is one reason why
despite the charge that Bohmian mechanics is an Everettian (many-worlds) interpretation
in disguise [2, 3], Bohmnian mechanics is different from an Everettian interpretation.
Furthermore, the quantum reconstruction program that generates the quantum mechanics
framework from epistemic requirements [4–6] suggests that the aforementioned statistics
story is worth considering. After all, if the quantum mechanics framework is just a theory
of inference and probability, why would it not be usable for naturally occurring ‘missing
variables’ epistemic contexts?
It is then said that hidden variables interpretations do not work because of famous no-go
theorems, such as the Kochen-Specker theorem [7–10]. However, these theorems actually
state that hidden variables interpretations have to be contextual. Contextuality is then
simply understood as a straightforward point that measurement results depend on how
measurements are performed. Measurement processes change nature, which is why con-
textuality arises. This is how quantum physics and its hidden variables generalization are
different from classical physics, where effects of measurement processes can often safely be
assumed to not exist. [11–13]
Given this introductory context, the general hidden variables framework is explored that
avoids difficulties hidden variables interpretations have in satisfying Lorentz invariance. The
possibility of a UV-complete but uncomputable final theory is presented. When a final theory
of physics is UV-complete but uncomputable, even if this theory is deterministic, quantum
supremacy is upheld - for matter of making predictions and testing them, an infinite sequence
of effective theories that are UV-incomplete but computable is inevitable. As argued in [14],
there is no good a priori justfication as to why a theory of quantum gravity has to be a final
UV-complete theory.
A combination of quantum reconstruction [4–6] and computational complexity arguments
[15] is presented as to defend the quantum supremacy argument - even if a hidden variables
interpretation is the correct view of quantum mechanics then, nothing may be extracted from
additional features of a hidden variable interpretation since a final deterministic theory is
uncomputable. We may be condemned to the orthodox quantum mechanics framework for
all practical matters.
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II. GENERAL HIDDEN VARIABLES FRAMEWORK
‘The’ single problem with Bohmian mechanics is that there is great difficulty in gener-
alizing it to reproduce quantum field theories. This is because Bohmian particle mechanics
is quite tied with the notion of particles due to its guiding equation, and how the guiding
equation should be generalized to fields or be modified remains very unclear. [16] This is
made harder by the fact that many attempts try to find a deterministic theory that directly
reproduces known quantum field theories.
Suppose that, given the aforementioned difficulties, there indeed exists no deterministic
theory that can be demonstrated to reproduce all empirical quantum field theories. Would
this mean that deterministic hidden variables interpretations are dead? The answer is no
- inability of demonstration does not equate to there being no such theory. This is about
whether a theory is computable or not.
A. UV-complete but uncomputable theory
It may be that despite a deterministic theory indeed being a final theory of the universe,
such a theory may not be computable as to provide us predictions. In such a case, all direct
generalization attempts to produce a satisfactory deterministic theory are, for sure, bound
to fail.
Instead of trying to derive a particular determinsitic theory then, we may instead look
at the general framework by which hidden variables interpretations would work.
As the name implies, hidden variables suggest that there are variables we do not know
well which create epistemic uncertainties that result in stochastic appearance. Just as in
social sciences contexts, for empirical or explantory simplification reasons, some variables
are not fully accounted in model or theory Ti. As we come to incorporate these variables,
we get a more fundamental theory Ti+1, Ti+2 and so on. There is no guarantee that a final
deterministic theory can be computed and used for predictions with finite procedures.
For all practical purposes then, there is an infinite sequence of effective quantum (prob-
abilistic) theories that define reality. Given finite constraints of our experience, we are
condemned to discover only some of these effective theories, one more fundamental than the
other.
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B. Computational complexity and information processing constraints
It is intuitively easy to suspect that a hidden variables theory allows for computational
advantages over conventional classical and quantum computers, given that a hidden variables
theory would replicate a usual quantum theory despite being deterministic. This has in fact
been theoretically explored in [15] with affirmation.
However, it is known that under reasonable informational constraints [4–6], a quantum
theory may uniquely be reconstructed as a theory of probability and inference. Thus, it may
seem that there must be some informational constraint underlying a quantum theory that
a hidden variables theory must violate.
There is a way out though - if one is banned from accessing additional computational ad-
vantage of hidden variables, then the problem disappears. And indeed this is what happens
when a final deterministic hidden variables theory is uncomputable. There may be other
ways out, but these would all require providing finite specifications of a hidden variables
theory that, as far as our current knowledge goes, all break down eventually due to quan-
tum field theory issues. Furthermore, inaccessibility of hidden variables mostly amount to
inevitability and supremacy of the orthodox quantum framework anyway.
The above quantum reconstruction - epistemic and information-theoretic constraint -
point of view subsumes discussions about Lorentz invariance in relation to hidden variables
theories as well. Different approaches to quantum reconstruction that point to uniqueness of
a quantum theory can suggest how Lorentz invariance is a consequence of different epistemic
principles, instead of itself having to be postulated. If so, then likely violation of Lorentz
invariance is a heavily serious issue for a computable hidden variables theory, explaining
away why it cannot satisfactorily reproduce known quantum field theories. And in such a
case, even if a computable hidden variables theory satisfies Lorentz invariance, it either has
no practical advantage over the orthodox quantum mechanics framework or is non-existent.
C. Ontic versus epistemic?
The idea of an uncomputable UV-complete final theory answers the question of what a
purely epistemic interpretation [17] of quantum mechanics that denies ontological reality
would mean. After all, would not knowledge require some underlying reality?
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In case a final theory is uncomputable, one may respond as follows. One may choose to
re-interpret a purely epistemic interpretation in terms of the hidden variables framework.
There, it is postulated that there are infinitely many hidden variables. Therefore, we have no
finite means of stating or specifying ontological reality. This condemns us to the project of
epistemology instead of ontology. At best, we may assume that the sum of knowledge from
an infinite sequence of effective quantum theories constitute deterministic yet inaccessible
reality. That is, one is asserting that a quantum theory is inevitably effective and incomplete.
In this sense, it makes no sense to think of each quantum state as a real entity.
D. Notion of spacetime in hidden variables interpretations
Recent entropic gravity approaches suggest an interesting possibility: gravity and space-
time may be a result of epistemic considerations. Once entropic data for matters are avail-
able, then in the semi-classical regime, one derives the Einstein field equations under the
entropy extremization principle. [18]
Having asserted that a quantum theory necessarily is effective and epistemic, it may
equally be argued that spacetime and gravity are only of provisional and epistemic nature -
they are not part of concrete ontological reality. This is especially so if gravity needs to be
captured in the quantum physics framework.
Depending on an effective theory then, spacetime and gravity can appear quite differently
from each other. That is, depending on an observation scale, how we would experience
spacetime may change. Note that the entropy extremization principle may be justified via
reasonable epistemic axioms in [19].
III. CONCLUSION
A usual understanding of a probabilistic model naturally suggests a hidden variables inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics, especially given uses in social sciences. However, quantum
reconstruction arguments based on information processing and epistemic constraints sug-
gest that a computable hidden variables (deterministic) theory is infeasible, together with
a computational complexity argument. This suggests that the most natural conclusion is:
a final UV-complete theory is uncomputable. In social science contexts, underlying poten-
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tially deterministic reality is never assumed to have finite number of hidden variables, so
essentially uniform lessons apply for both social and natural sciences.
Under a final UV-complete theory that is uncomputable, the best we can do is an infinite
sequence of effective quantum theories. The hidden variables framework offers a straight-
forward reason as to why the measurement problem arises - hidden variables cause it. Yet
because a final theory is uncomputable, we cannot completely track and pin down the exact
source of the measurement problem. As an effective theory, each quantum theory is to be
interpreted in an epistemic way - quantum state is not a real entity.
This suggests that gravity may also only be of epistemic nature, given that gravity is
considered to require the quantum physics framework. Then depending on an observation
scale, how a subject experiences spacetime may differ.
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